














Shelley’s novel has been fertile ground for ecocritics over the last two decades. In Ecocriticism 
and the Idea of Culture (2014, 2016) I wrote about Frankenstein and culture’s dialectical 
horror of nature. As a narrative of failed continuity, Frankenstein also exhibits our fear of 
culture, its machine determinism, of monstrous production in place of sustainable reproduction. 
Victor, the isolated, compulsive scientist is not unlike the figure of the lone programmer, coding 
for the “enhanced” human or cyborg of his uncritical posthuman dreams. Our world and its 
problems demonstrate that Frankenstein continues to be a prescient novel: before Darwin’s 
theory of evolution, and long before genetic modification and what we call information 
technology, Shelley imagined the creation of a being as an assemblage of contingent 
“natureculture” in a bildungsroman that juxtaposes its creator’s. While the novel invites us to 
consider the political promise of the monster (as I’ve argued elsewhere), it is also a commentary 
on the dangers of solitude, the dangers of failing to honour the social and ecological 
contingency, the entanglement, of all things in the pursuit of knowledge. 
 
 
This year marks an anniversary. It is Karl Marx’s 200th birthday. It is also, of 
course, the 200th anniversary of Mary Shelley’s world-shaping story about the 
construction of a new species from the raw materials of humanity. Shelley’s 
novel1 has been fertile ground for a wide variety of cultural narratives, for plays, 
films, and television, and for discourses about science, new technology and its 
implications. For literary critics, the novel has become increasingly important in 
the last few decades. Ecocriticism, as well as science and animal studies, have 
 
1  All quotations from Frankenstein in this article follow the text of Mary Shelley, 
Frankenstein or The Modern Prometheus, The 1818 Text, ed. Marilyn Butler (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 1998). Subsequent page references appear in 





used the novel as a tool for thinking about everything from the implications of 
microtechnology, such as gene editing and nanorobotics, 2  to the ontological 
horizon of the Anthropocene. 
In Ecocriticism and the Idea of Culture,3 I wrote about Frankenstein’s expression 
of culture’s dialectical horror of nature.4 The drive for technological innovation 
may be seen as an extension of or reaction to this horror; while such progress 
attempts to keep entropy at bay, it may also become its servant. As a narrative of 
failed continuity, Frankenstein also exhibits our fear of capitalist culture and its 
machinic determinism, of monstrous production in place of reproduction and 
sustainability. Victor Frankenstein, the isolated, compulsive scientist is not 
unlike the figure of the lone programmer, coding for the “enhanced” human 
(cyborg or downloaded-consciousness) of his uncritical posthuman dreams.  
Our world and its problems demonstrate that Frankenstein continues to be a 
prescient novel: long before the publication of Darwin’s or Wallace’s theories of 
evolution, long before information technology and genetic modification, Shelley 
imagined the creation of a being as an assemblage of contingent nature-culture in 
a bildungsroman that parallels its creator’s own contingent Bildung. While the 
novel invites us to consider the political promise of the monster, it is also a 
 
2  “A nanorobot, then, is a machine that can build and manipulate things precisely at an 
atomic level. […] While some people dismiss the future of nanorobots as science 
fiction, you should realize that each of us is alive today because of countless nanobots 
operating within each of our trillions of cells. We give them biological names like a 
‘ribosome,’ but they are essentially machines programmed with a function like ‘read 
messenger RNA to create a specific protein.’” Peter H. Diamandis, “Nanorobots: 
Where We Are Today and Why Their Future Has Amazing Potential,” SingularityHub, 
16 May 2016, https://singularityhub.com/2016/05/16/nanorobots-where-we-are-today-
and-why-their-future-has-amazing-potential/#sm.00000beqsxfgnlcx0ryxlm01hpz0d  
(accessed 3 November 2018).  
3  Helena Feder, Ecocriticism and the Idea of Culture: Biology and the Bildungsroman (London: 
Ashgate, 2014).  
4  The environmental context of the novel’s composition is registered in Frankenstein as 
“culture’s terror of nature’s agency – of oceans and ice, storms and jagged peaks” 
(Feder 73). The storm scene in which Victor sees the monster in the Alps, following 
William’s murder, is significant not only because it is drawn from Shelley’s time in the 
region (recorded in History of a Six Weeks’ Tour), but also because it links the power and 
agency of nonhuman nature to the person of the monster. “[… C]onnections between 
nonhuman nature and the produced body of the monster surface in the monster 
himself: a nonhuman creature and a product of human culture” (Feder 73). Frankenstein 
registers this terror of nonhuman agency as, in part, the humanist anxiety of 
objectification (such as Victor’s horror at being the object of his creature’s gaze). 




commentary on the dangers of failing to care for social and ecological 
contingency, the entanglement of all things – knowledge as well as agents – in 
the pursuit of knowledge. The radical potential of the monster turns two ways: 
he is both a nonhuman agent, working against the forces from which he was 
made, and a warning about the way in which technological development often 
functions in this culture, reducing the human and the nonhuman to the raw 
materials of capitalist (re)production. However myopic or utopian the intentions 
of its creators, this ‘progress’ is always part of the ongoing consolidation of 
power that makes such advancement possible. As Marx had it, there is no 
innocence within capitalism.  
In 2017 an unusual reading of the novel appeared in the journal BioScience. In 
this article, based on a mathematical model of the consequences of the 
population growth of the monster’s progeny, Nathaniel J. Dominy and Justin D. 
Yeakel argue that Frankenstein’s decision not to finish a female monster, while 
impulsive, was  
 
preceded by agonized reasoning that would be familiar to any student of 
ecology or evolutionary biology. Here, we present a formal treatment of 
Frankenstein’s reasoning and show that his rationale for denying a mate 
to his male creation has empirical justification. Our results suggest that 
the decision was prudent because it averted our own extinction by 
competitive exclusion. We conclude by suggesting that the central horror 
of Mary Shelley’s novel lies in its prescient command of foundational 
concepts in ecology and evolution.5  
 
In an interview-article in Phys.org,6 the authors of this study argue that although 
the notion of “competitive exclusion” didn’t emerge until the 1930s, Shelley 
understood the concept; based on 1816 population densities, “‘[w]e calculated 
that a founding population of two creatures could drive us to extinction in as 
little as 4,000 years,’ said Dominy.” This central horror, the recognition of human 
vulnerability, of our lives as animals in complex ecosystems with other creatures, 
is connected in the novel to the more horrifying realization: the Pyrrhic outcome 
of the technological truncation or transcendence of nature. If it were a joke, it 
 
5  Nathanial J. Dominy and Justin D. Yeakel, “Frankenstein and the Horrors of 
Competitive Exclusion,” BioScience, 67.2 (2017): 107.  
6  “How Frankenstein Saved Humankind from Probable Extinction,” https://phys.org/ 
news/2016-10-frankenstein-humankind-probable-extinction.html, 28 October 2016 (accessed 





might almost be funny (‘if nature doesn’t get you, culture will,’ or Woody 
Allen’s version of this idea: “I am at two with nature.”).  
Again, quite aside from the intentions of scientists and engineers themselves, 
technological innovation is often isolated or isolating; although much of this 
work is undertaken by groups in labs or corporate compounds, as opposed to an 
individual in a gothic tower, these are often socially, culturally circumscribed 
worlds within worlds. By its very nature it is unseen by the world at large (until 
completed or commodified) and so, in a sense, unseeing, just as Victor seems 
completely unaware of the nature or meaning of what he produced until it opens 
its eyes and looks back at him (and he flees in horror, of his monster, of himself7). 
This isolation, Frankenstein suggests, may blind the creators of new technology to 
any potential social and ecological consequences. And perhaps to the value of 
social and ecological life in general.  
The nested structure of Shelley’s novel, with narrations embedded within 
narrations, conversations within conversations themselves recorded and 
forwarded through letters from the Arctic explorer Robert Walton to his sister, 
Mrs. Margaret Saville,8 calls attention both to the profound isolation of its central 
characters and the emotional, intellectual, and ecological importance of social 
affiliation. Walton, our frame narrator, longs for a friend to share his thoughts 
and adventures; our middle narrator, Victor, isolates himself from his loving 
family and his academic community in his attempt to transcend the boundaries 
of life and death with the creation of his monster; and our most embedded 
narrator, the monster himself, is the loneliest of all, the only one of his kind in all 
the world, spurned by humanity, desperately longing for a parent, friend, or 
 
7  “It was already one in the morning; the rain pattered dismally against the panes, and 
my candle was nearly burnt out, when, by the glimmer of the half-extinguished light, I 
saw the dull yellow eye of the creature open; it breathed hard, and a convulsive motion 
agitated its limbs. How can I describe my emotions at this catastrophe, or how 
delineate the wretch whom with such infinite pains and care I had endeavoured to 
form? His limbs were in proportion, and I had selected his features as beautiful. 
Beautiful! – Great God! His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and 
arteries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of a pearly 
whiteness; but these luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery 
eyes, that seemed almost of the same colour as the dun white sockets in which they 
were set, his shrivelled complexion, and straight black lips […]. Unable to endure the 
aspect of the being I had created, I rushed out of the room, and continued a long time 
traversing my bedchamber, unable to compose my mind to sleep” (38-39).  
8  As many have noted, this ‘audience’ has the same initials as the author (Margaret 
[Walton] Saville – Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley). 




mate. The only character to survive the narrative is Victor’s brother, and former 
pupil, Ernest, the one set on a path of relationality; as Elizabeth had it, Ernest 
was to become a farmer.  
As I’ve written elsewhere, for Victor, his intended wife, Elizabeth Lavenza, 
“embodies domesticated nature, a space of absence cultivated with human 
presence” 9: “The world was to me a secret, which I desired to discover; to her it 
was a vacancy, which she sought to people with imaginations of her own” (21). 
Here Victor attributes to Elizabeth a quality of his own, denying in himself and 
in his work the relationship between knowledge and oppression, between 
aspects of the Enlightenment project and imperialism, patriarchy, and racism (it 
is Victor, after all, not Elizabeth, who seeks to “people” the world). Victor’s 
characterization of Elizabeth also suggests that, to some extent, Victor viewed 
her world as empty, rather than the other way around; Elizabeth never says 
anything herself (in Victor’s retelling) that would support his view of her 
relationship to nature. In fact, the pieces of remembered conversation Victor 
narrates suggest otherwise, such as her opposition to the elder Frankenstein’s 
plans for Ernest Frankenstein to become a lawyer. Again, it is Elizabeth who 
suggests that Ernest should become a farmer, because “he is continually in the 
open air, climbing the hills, or rowing on the lake […]. A farmer’s life is a very 
healthy happy life; and the least hurtful, or rather the most beneficial profession 
of any” (45). As Anne K. Mellor argues, Elizabeth’s plan for Ernest demonstrates 
a commitment to an ethic of mutual dependence and cooperation.10 Far from 
viewing the world as empty, Elizabeth sees the world as a presence, a partner in 
the project of life. Unlike Victor, Elizabeth seems to strive for harmony with 
nature rather than the pursuit of nature “to her hiding places” (36). For this reason, 
Victor’s choice of the word “vacancy” in this context is particularly telling.11  
 
9  Feder 59. 
10  Anne K. Mellor, “Possessing Nature: the Female in Frankenstein,” Frankenstein: The 
1818 Text, Contexts, Nineteenth-century Responses, Modern Criticism, ed. J. Paul Hunter 
(New York: Norton, 1996) 284.  
11  A word choice that I discuss in Feder 60, echoes the key ontological problem of Percy 
Shelley’s “Mont Blanc,” originally published in History of a Six Weeks’ Tour: “And what 
were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea, / If to the human mind’s imaginings / Silence 
and solitude were vacancy?” (P.B. Shelley, “Mont Blanc” [142-44], P.B. Shelley and 
Mary Shelley, History of a Six-Weeks Tour 1817, facsimile edition [Otley: Woodstock 
Books, 2002] 183). There are several readings of the novel that foreground Victor’s 
usurpation or negation of the female role in reproduction (one way to read his 
projection of “vacancy”), including Katerina Kitsi-Mitakou’s conclusion: “Frankenstein 





Victor’s creature is truly a monster “turned loose upon society” (170) – 
indeed, he embodies the social consequences of a culturally-produced antisocial 
pursuit (a contradiction that only deepens: this abandoned creature longs for 
society more than anything else, a need Victor cannot fulfil if he is to preserve 
human societies). As Victor warns Walton, “If the study to which you apply 
yourself has a tendency to weaken your affections […] then that study is 
certainly unlawful, that is to say, not befitting the human mind” (37). Or, as 
Victor has it later, “A selfish pursuit had cramped and narrowed me” (51). 
Destruction, or “evil,” is as banal here as Arendt had it: an inability to see one’s 
self, one’s actions, in a larger context.12 Humans are social animals; we not only 
need to be with others physically to keep our actions in perspective, to maintain 
an ethical balance, we need to keep the existence of others in mind, to be with 
them emotionally. Even the monster, who repeatedly bemoans his isolation, 
claims in his first conversation with Victor, “My vices are the children of a forced 
solitude that I abhor” (121). For Victor and his double, it is solitude that is 
unnatural. And yet, as Victor narrates to Walton a few pages later, following his 
conversation with the monster, he “took refuge in the most perfect solitude. I 
passed whole days on the lake alone in a little boat, watching the clouds, and 
listening to the rippling of the waves, silent and listless” (124). This form of 
“solitude” is different from the one Victor embraced in Ingolstadt13 to make his 
monster, and his immersion in solitude on a near-barren rock, “on one of the 
remotest Orkneys,” to create a female for his monster “ungazed at and 
unmolested” (136). And it is different, again, from the even more isolated, 
uninhabitable place he, and the monster, end up – the Arctic, where Victor dies 
and the monster disappears, “borne away by the waves, and lost in darkness and 
distance” (191). 
On the lake Victor is, as one might say in the nineteenth or twentieth century, 
“communing with nature,” something we do far less in the twenty-first, 
according to a study funded by the Nature Conservancy: “From backyard 
gardening to mountain climbing, outdoor activities are on the wane as people 
around the world spend more leisure time online or in front of the tube […] 
 
Woman Born’: Colonizing the Womb from Frankenstein’s Mother to Naomi 
Mitchison’s Clone Mums,” Biotechnological and Medical Themes in Science Fiction, ed. 
Domna Pastourmatzi [Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2002] 211).  
12  See, e.g., Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind: The Groundbreaking Investigation on How 
We Think (New York: Harcourt, 1978) 49-51 and passim. 
13  Now, of course, a marketing ploy if not a tourist attraction: https://www.ingolstadt-
tourismus.de/en/tourist-information/unique-to-ingolstadt/frankenstein.html (accessed 
3 November 2018). 




‘Videophilia has been shown to be a cause of obesity, lack of socialization, 
attention disorders and poor academic performance.’”14 In this scene, nature is 
not “vacant” (as Victor may have consciously or unconsciously perceived it 
before); truly “silence and solitude” in this context are not vacancy (as “Mont 
Blanc” suggests). Does Victor return to a sense of his own embodiment and 
ecological embeddedness? His continuity with and within a large more-than-
human community? His father tells him that he seems “to be returning to 
yourself. And yet you are still unhappy, and still avoid our society. [… But] if it 
is well founded, I conjure you to avow it [… or] draw down treble misery on us 
all” (124-25). In what follows, it becomes clear that Victor’s father is referring to 
his upcoming marriage with Elizabeth and his fear that perhaps Victor is 
avoiding their society because he views her as a sister and not a future wife. But 
his first statement hangs ambiguously in the narrative, causing Victor to tremble 
“violently” (125). Victor, as we know, has good reason to avoid human society 
(Elizabeth might well have been spared had he not married her) even as it was his 
isolation that enabled his solipsistic technological innovation in the first place.  
Just as consciousness is an emergent property of human gene-culture-
environment co-evolution, the recursive nature of some technology creates a 
vicious cycle. Aside from any immediate foreseen or unforeseen social and 
ecological consequences, certain technologies both create a distinctly new, 
divergent future for humanity and commit us to a form of repetition: a spiraling 
trajectory. Victor’s entanglement with his monster is an embodiment of this 
phenomenon: isolation produces further, deeper isolation. Some technology 
creates new versions of the problems it was made to solve, needs it cannot fulfill. 
In this case, composing a new species from the raw material of humanity, with 
either a view to defeating death or to remaking our species, only leads to death. 
For readers, one hopes, a more profound sense of human contingency and 
vulnerability, social and ecological embeddedness. Perhaps the most horrifying 
thing about Frankenstein is that this has not lately been the case.  
Frankenstein is a novel of failed continuity, one which depicts and critiques 
this tragedy. Equally, Victor is an uncritical posthumanist.15 And so are some of 
 
14  “Communing With Nature Less And Less,” ScienceDaily, 5 February 2008, 
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/02/080204172316.htm (accessed 3 November 2018). 
15  “The belief that technological development, as a unified generative force, will enable 
human life to ‘evolve’ indefinitely promotes a view of humans as, paradoxically, 
inherently outside and above the rest of nature. This view of technology and the 
material world fuels and is fueled by the enterprises of late capitalism, from 
monocropping and factory farming to the genetic modification and creation of 





Shelley’s readers. Mladen Jakovljević is not alone when he observes that 
Frankenstein contains a “prophetic image of the posthuman.”16 Catherine Waldby, 
for example, seems to celebrate the novel’s prescience:  
 
Shelley takes the first fictional step towards understanding what artificial 
life and artificial intelligence might mean. Frankenstein has become the 
archetypal techno-monster story in part because of this prefigurative 
power, its anticipation of the potentials of science to create new forms of life.17  
 
Interestingly, Waldby argues Frankenstein describes and prefigures “a world in 
which the human body and human sociality owe a greater and greater debt to 
technoscientific and machinic systems,”18 without giving weight to the way in 
which the novel records the breakdown of human sociality at the hands of those 
“technoscientific and machinic systems.” That is where the novel is truly 
prescient, where it prefigures a social “debt” not unlike the debt of colonization 
levied onto the colonized by global neoliberal capitalism.  
Despite the advent of what might be more aptly termed anti-social networks 
and media, the human trafficking and exploitation facilitated by the “dark web,” 
the rise of what Vandana Shiva aptly terms “biopiracy,”19 and the increasing 
consolidation of material and political power over human and nonhuman life 
through technoscientific systems generally, when some readers and critics refer 
to the novel as “prophetic,” they actually mean it positively. Jay Clayton notes 
the way in which “a few influential writers and artists have begun to interpret 
Shelley’s tale of a modern Prometheus as promising things they would like to see 
 
Shelley’s novel suggests, it is just this kind of technological intervention at issue in 
Frankenstein. One might even say that Victor Frankenstein is an uncritical posthumanist. 
Both Candide and Frankenstein problematize systematic rationalism; as narratives of 
individual human development, they speak to the humanist notion of development 
itself, and its (technological) trajectory” (Feder 51). 
16  Mladen Jakovljević, “Do Androids Dream of a Modern Prometheus?” Rethinking 
Tradition in English Language and Literary Studies, ed. Željka Babić, Tatjana Bijelić and 
Petar Penda (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2017) 169.  
17  Catherine Waldby, “The Instruments of Life: Frankenstein and Cyberculture,” 
Prefiguring Cyberculture: An Intellectual History, ed. Daren Tofts, Annemarie Jonson and 
Alessio Cavallaro (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002) 29.  
18  Waldby 29. 
19  Vandana Shiva, Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge (Boston: South End 
Press, 1999).  




happen in real life.”20 And then there are scientists. Clayton cites two radical 
proponents of AI, “Hans Moravec, founder of the world’s largest robotics 
program at Carnegie Mellon University, and Rodney A. Brooks, director of the 
MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory,” who not only “share a fundamental 
belief that the future belongs to silicon rather than carbon-based life forms,” but 
“welcome the idea of a new species supplanting humanity entirely.”21 Clayton 
sees the utilitarian view of Moravec and Brooks as of a piece with the “stern 
rationalism advocated by Shelley’s father, William Godwin, to whom she 
dedicated Frankenstein.” 22  Yet, over and over, the novel warns against such 
rationalism, reason disconnected from social feeling (sympathy, empathy), 
needs, and responsibilities. When thought and feeling aren’t artificially 
separated, and separated from others, it’s harder to rationalize violence, to pursue 
an end without any thought of the costs to others.  
A consideration of the compartmentalization of thought and feeling, or of 
knowledge itself (and indeed this consideration of Frankenstein at 200) would not 
be complete without a word about “STEM.” In her January 2018 blog, 
“Frankenstein Is about Us Not STEM,” sociologist of science Brigitte Nerlich 
claims the novel is “not about science, or more importantly is not about flawed 
science,” but “about creatures.”23 Surely the novel is “about” all of these things. 
Nerlich argues that the two new editions of the novel (brought out for the 200th 
anniversary) operate, to varying degrees, on what she disparagingly calls “the 
deficit model”: the idea that scientists and engineers have a deficit in ethical 
reasoning that must be remedied through education. Without driving a pitchfork 
through the heart of STEM,24 this oversimplification is countered by contextuali-
 
20  Jay Clayton, “Frankenstein’s Futurity: Replicants and Robots,” The Cambridge Companion 
to Mary Shelley, ed. Esther Schor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 85. 
Clayton continues: “This development takes two forms: first, revisions that explore 
genetic and reproductive technology; second, those that reimagine Frankenstein in a 
world of cyborgs, artificial intelligence (AI), artificial life (AL), and robotics” (85). 
21  Clayton 94. 
22  Clayton 94. 
23  Brigitte Nerlich, “Frankenstein Is about Us Not STEM,” University of Nottingham, 
19 January 2018, http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/makingsciencepublic/2018/01/19/ 
frankenstein-us-not-stem (accessed 20 May 2018). 
24  STEM is, after all, a monster of Frankensteinian proportions, made from the raw 
materials of scientific inquiry and the idea of the university. Like Victor’s poor 
monster, its existence threatens that from which it has been made (but unlike Victor’s 
monster, less sympathetically). These are hard times for the ‘unapplied’ sciences and 
the humanities. They’re attacked ideologically, defunded by state legislatures, and forced 





zation: in late capitalism, we all suffer from a deficit of ethical reasoning; global 
neoliberalism embodies and cultivates this deficit in ethical reasoning. It does so 
in part through the compartmentalization of knowledge and the prioritization of 
those lines of inquiry which may be commodified (“applied” sciences and 
technological development). As the philosopher of science Rebecca Newberger 
Goldstein argues, science is very good at describing the world, but we need the 
humanities to interpret or give it meaning.25 Science needs to be part of a much 
broader cultural inquiry into the nature of what it means to be human animals in 
a world of complex assemblages of human and nonhuman natures, as well as 
animals and ecosystems that require space free from humans and human-made 
things (from depleted uranium to microplastics).  
Unlike many current, scientifically-minded arguments for the novel’s 
prescience, Shalon Noble’s reading of the monster as “a figure for thinking 
through a new nature formed through human intervention: the Anthropocene”26 
recognizes the duality of the monster’s radical nature.27 As the “spirit of the 
 
Students: An Education: How Many Students of the Humanities Are Needed?” The 
Economist, Free Exchange, 1 February 2010, https://www.economist.com/free-exchange/ 
2010/02/01/an-education  (accessed 3 November 2018). 
25  Andrew Anthony, “Rebecca Newberger Goldstein: ‘Science is our best answer, but it 
takes a philosophical argument to prove that,’” The Guardian, 19 October 2014, https:// 
www.theguardian.com/books/2014/oct/19/rebecca-newberger-goldstein-interview-science-
philosophy-plato-googleplex (accessed 3 November 2018): “‘There are two kinds of 
questions,’ she says. ‘What is? and What matters? And when it comes to descriptions 
of reality, ontology, I do think that science is our best answer, but I think it takes a 
philosophical argument to prove that. It’s an epistemological argument. You have to 
argue for scientific realism against instrumentalism, and that’s all philosophical stuff. 
But the upshot is that science provides the best description of what is: it’s energy and 
matter and genes and neurons. That’s what reality consists of. But the realm of 
philosophy is in trying to reconcile what science is telling us – which is why 
philosophers have to know science – with other intuitions we have, without which we 
can’t make sense of our lives.” 
26  Shalon Noble, “An Uncertain Spirit of an Unstable Place: Frankenstein in the Anthropocene,” 
Romantic Ecocriticism: Origins and Legacies, ed. Dewey W. Hall (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2016) 124.  
27  Noble 123-24: “Ecocritically, Romanticism has held a privileged place since its 
historical moment coincides with the Industrial Revolution, often read as the advent of 
the modem world as we know it. That the two moments coincide is no coincidence; a 
cornerstone of Romanticism is its bearing witness, often explicitly, to the radical 
potential for change, for better or worse, inherent in the scientific and technological 
advances of its time. […] Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein stands out as one of the most 
thorough Romantic engagements with contemporary science, since Shelley situates the 




Anthropocene,” he is “himself the very transgression that a conventional genius 
loci would warn against” – but he “does not simply warn against transgression, 
however, for he represents a nature already transgressed against. In the 
Anthropocene, the transgressive genius loci demands community with the 
transgressor.”28 Noble is right to point out that, like Victor and his monster, the 
future of humanity and the Anthropocene are interdependent; but the dis-ease, 
the generative force of technological capitalism he carries (the inescapable 
potential of his existence against social and ecological health), cannot be cured by 
“engaged sympathy” with the patient alone (as Noble suggests), though the lack 
of such sympathy among humans and with nonhuman others seems a source of 
the illness in the first place.29 The future of many other species is, sadly, not 
interdependent with the Anthropocene: the Anthropocene precludes their 
futures altogether. This is what we call the Sixth Mass Extinction. 
The genii (or genius loci) cannot be put back into the bottle; there is, as we all 
know, no going back. The monster stands both for and against the combined 
forces which made him – nature and culture. Yes, “[i]n the Monster, nature has 
re-wilded, appearing strange with an agency that defies human efforts to contain 
it.”30 But the horror is that technological capitalism has “wilded” too, and not in 
ways which are sustainable for other natures and cultures. Unsurprisingly, 
Frankenstein itself has become wild in the vast landscape of culture, as meme, 
narrative, and genie, generating both critiques and celebrations of the pursuit of 
 
work within the contemporary landscape of scientific discovery. The preface (written 
by Percy Shelley) to the 1818 edition opens with an appeal to ‘Dr. Darwin, and some of 
the physio-logical writers of Germany’ to support the idea that the events of the novel 
are ‘not of impossible occurrence.’ […] Such scientific approaches to Frankenstein 
coincide with the industrial reading of the novel in which a mad scientist’s hubristic 
desire for domination over nature leads to devastation: for himself, his loved ones, and 
potentially for all of humanity. In this industrial reading, Frankenstein, like many 
Romantic texts, reacts against the dangerous interventions into nature that its author 
witnessed around her. It is commonplace now to speak of Romanticism and 
industrialism together, reading in Romanticism a reaction against the ‘dark Satanic 
Mills’ (à la Blake) of contemporary industrial advance. While Frankenstein clearly 
engages the anxieties of its present moment, anxiety is, of course, not bound by the 
present; anxiety anticipates what might be. […] I read the Monster ecologically as a 
trope or figure for the future and its monstrous promise. The figure for Shelley’s future 
is the figure for our present.” My emphasis and conclusions differ, but this is an 
insightful, timely reading of the novel. 
28  Noble 131-33. 
29  Noble 135. 





transcendence (of human sociality, the ecological community, or the material 
conditions of life). As part of the cultural imaginary, it is also a place from which 
science itself, its ambitions and achievements, may originate: as Jasia Reichardt 
points out, while Frankenstein “has passed into general mythology,” and new, 
transgenic animals “have become an industry.”31  
The form of thought is the form of the social;32 200 years after its initial 
publication, Frankenstein is a culturally pervasive shorthand for framing fear and 
desire in terms of the antinomies of freedom and determinism. What, then, does 
it mean that we keep dreaming of forms of disembodiment that arise from and 
threaten to destroy the social itself? 33  That Transhumanists invest untold 
amounts of money in the pursuit of ‘immortality’ or the ‘evolution’ of the species 
through cyborgs or the cloud? It reflects the crisis levels of income inequality and 
ecological degeneration of late capitalism; it reflects a struggle to continue to find 
meaning in a world more technologically mediated and corporately controlled 
than ever before; it reflects our enduring need for feelings of immediacy which 
we experience as belonging. As a real world of self and others, in which their 
complex interrelations, their mutuality and contingency, matter. And on this 
year which also marks the 200th anniversary of Marx’s birth, capitalism remains, 
like Frankenstein’s enduring monster, a mechanism by which society consumes 
itself (and the idea of itself). Our thoughts on form – on embodiment, evolution, 
and extinction – are indeed also our thoughts about (and in capitalism, our 
rational fears of) the social.  
 
 
31  Jasia Reichardt, “Artificial Life and the Myth of Frankenstein,” Frankenstein, Creation, 
Monstrosity, ed. Stephen Bann (London: Reaktion Books, 1994) 136, 146. 
32  As my friend Neil Larsen is fond of saying. 
33  A question I will take up again in another article, on Frankenstein’s recombination/ 
reincarnation in a recent novel by Michel Houellebecq. 
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